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Abstract
In this introductory essay, the author defines the economic vision of Europe for its internal
market. Next, she will note how various Articles in this issue either express the vision, the tensions
that lie within it, or the difficulties of the tasks involved in achieving it. She concludes by observing
that Europe is grappling with a panoply of questions that will, in one decade or another, present
themselves to the world, and while the world may not choose Europe’s answers to the questions,
it will be the wiser for confronting them.

INTRODUCTION
VISION OF EUROPE:
LESSONS FOR THE WORLD
Eleanor M. Fox*
This Ninth Annual Issue on European Community Law is a
volume rich in depth and breadth. Dedicated to Jacques Delors,
visionary of one Europe, it spans the array of issues inherent in
the task of integrating a community of nations while sufficiently
preserving national autonomy and local diversity. The effort of
the European Community ("Community" or "EC") to create a
market without frontiers is daunting. Yet I submit that this enterprise, with certain modifications, provides a microcosm for
the challenge facing the trading nations of the world in an increasingly globalized economy. The seeds of this global enterprise are likely to be sown in the next round of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, in its new incarnation as the
World Trade Organization. For the global community, seeking
greater openness, access, and economic opportunity and the attendant benefits of freedom, there are lessons to be leained
from Europe, many of which emerge from the pages of this
book.
In this introductory essay, I define the economic vision of
Europe for its internal market. Next, I note how various Articles
in this issue either express the vision, the tensions that lie within
it, or the difficulties of the tasks involved in achieving it. I conclude by observing that Europe is grappling with a panoply of
questions that will, in one decade or another, present themselves
to the world, and while the world may not choose Europe's answers to the questions, it will be the wiser for confronting them.
THE ECONOMIC VISION OFEUROPE
To stabilize the conditions for peace in an erstwhile warring
Europe, and to establish the conditions for a robust economy
with markets sufficiently large to support efficient firms, six na* Walter Derenberg Professor of Trade Regulation, New York University School of
Law. Member of the Editorial Advisory Board of the FordhamInternationalLaw Journal.
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tions at the center of Western Europe designed and signed the
Treaty of Rome in 1957.1 The brilliant basic concept was to lift
the frontiers that stood as border barriers around each of the
nation-states, and to assure that neither governments nor private
firms could replace them, directly or indirectly, by border restraints or discriminatory measures, or measures of equivalent
effect. These first principles are enshrined in Articles 2, 3, and 5
of the Treaty of Rome, in the four freedoms, and in the articles
establishing a common competition policy, which apply not only
to private actors but also to state-owned enterprises, state-licensed enterprises, and state aids.
The vision of free movement across a Europe without frontiers has a seamless character. National trade laws, such as antidumping and countervailing duty laws; were abolished. Trade
law was transmogrified into freedom of movement law, and the
right to undistorted competition. In this sense, for the internal
market, trade law became "undistorted-competition law," and
the "undistorted-competition law" of the internal market caught
public and private distortions alike.
The first principles of the EC internal market centrally prohibit "beggar thy neighbor" restraints - restraints by one nation
or its citizens designed to profit by imposing costs on another
member nation or its citizens. Thus, it was and is absolutely forbidden for Germany to order its producers to combine to exploit the French, or for French producers to cartelize to exploit
the Germans. Parochial, nationalistic restraints are utterly forbidden.
It was recognized, however, that some normal and not parochial public or private action may have spillover effects on one's
neighbors and it was necessary to devise principles to distinguish
legitimate from illegitimate measures. Some of these measures
would be legitimate simply because they served a proper national interest, but only if they were proportional and narrowly
tailored to serve that interest. Other such measures would be
legitimate because they also served larger objectives of the European Community, such as "lifting up" the least well off regions of
1. For the economic blueprint of the European Community and the institutional
system to carry out the objectives, see generally GEORGE A. BERMANN, ROGERJ. GOEBEL,
WILLIAM J. DAVEY & ELEANOR M Fox, CASES AND MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

LAw (1993).
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the Community and thereby enhancing social and economic cohesion. For all permitted derogations from the one-Europe vision, transparency and proportionality were, and are, necessary
conditions.
Moreover, especially after the border barriers were lifted,
two phenomena appeared regarding different national regimes
regulating a variety of conditions, such as product safety and the
environment. First, sometimes the regimes clashed, or the need
to comply with several systems imposed unnecessary costs, interfering with inter-Member State trade. Second, firms operating in
regimes with a higher level of regulation thought themselves to
be at an unfair competitive disadvantage because of the costs of
regulation. Third, for some problems, such as environmental
spillovers, common solutions would be superior to individual solutions. Accordingly, the Community developed methodologies
for bringing bodies of law into harmony; and for goods in transit
not subject to common policy, it developed the rule of law that
member nations must give mutual recognition to the regulation
(e.g., safety certifications) of one another.
The system's effectiveness depends upon acceptance of
Community law in the Member States. Accordingly, the Court of
Justice of the European Communities (the "Court of Justice")
has ruled that Community law is supreme, and clear rules of
Community law are directly applicable in the Member States;
that is, they are a part of the body of the law of each nation.2
The paragraphs above concern economic foundations.
Omitted, therefore, is the governance process within the Community, including the processes by which legislation is proposed
and passed - a realm often described with the epithet, "democracy deficit." Along with the perceived democracy deficit is the
perception of bureaucratic excess, and the claim that "bureaucrats in Brussels" extend their tentacles into the lives of the distant country men and women. Can a nation retain an accepta2. The principles of the EC blueprint for freedom of trade without discrimination
have easy application to free trade areas beyond the Community. They have long applied in the EFTA free trade area. As Eastern Europe has spectacularly democratized
and moved to freer markets, the European Community has brought the most basic of
its first principles eastward.
For a suggested adaptation of the principles to North America, see AMERICAN BAR
ASSOCIATION, THE REPORT OF THE ABA ANTrrRusT SECTION TASK FORCE ON THE COMPETITION DIMENSION OF THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (1994).
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ble share of power and responsibility while conferring power on
supranational institutions whose word is supreme? The question
resonates, and properly so; but yet, as we move rapidly towards
the twenty-first century, a Europe with restored frontiers is all
but unthinkable. The shrinking world itself is in search of principles to assure openness, non-parochialism, and methodologies
for bringing disparate regulatory regimes into harmony.
THE NINTH ANNUAL ISSUE: THE TASKS OFEUROPE
Each of the Articles in this issue deals with problems or virtues of centralization. The Articles may be placed into five categories: (1) the role of the Court of Justice, (2) state aids and
their compatibility with the Community, (3) telecommunications: the fit of common policy with Member State policy and of
regulation with competition, (4) duties of firms that control access to essential facilities, and (5) the overarching subject of subsidiarity and sovereignty. The coverage is enriched by diversity
of perspective. Among the authors are Commission officials and
an Advocate General of the Court of Justice, the French ViceChair of competition enforcement, a practitioner from Spain, a
U.S. law clerk/scholar, and a U.S. student. Not surprisingly, the
officials of the Community convey the strongest sense both of
the mission for an integrated Europe and of the magnitude of
achievements in this direction, while others explore the complexities of the problems and the tension between federalist central control and national autonomy.
I begin with the Court of Justice, which is the focus of the
opening Article and the Comment. From the outset, this distinguished judicial institution took virtually all available opportunities to make Community institutions robust and to endow them
with the necessary powers to assure the emergence of a vital, integrated Europe. While the activism has been criticized on
grounds of process and interpretation, it has been credited with
making possible a meaningful European Community that is a
player in the world today.
Fittingly, in the opening piece, Advocate General Carl Otto
Lenz describes the supremacy of Community law and its reception into the Member States, and the mechanism by which Member State courts may and often must pose questions to the Court
ofJustice to assure that the Member State courts give the proper
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interpretation to Community law and that Community law is uniformly applied. The prospect of varying interpretations is
viewed by Advocate General Lenz not as an expression of possibility and diversity but as "a potential danger... [to] the functioning of the EC legal system as a whole" - as well it might be
when states as diverse as France and Great Britain are charged
with applying common (external) customs regulations and implementing the common agricultural and social security systems.
It is perhaps of some interest that in one of the few cases detailed by Advocate General Lenz to explain the system of reference, the Court's answer to a British court's question directed
the British court to do an act (temporarily refusing to apply an
Act of Parliament) that the British constitutional system forbade.
Coincidentally, the student Comment deals also with the
Court ofJustice. Commenting on MarshallII, a case concerning
equal treatment for women in the workplace, Gina L. Ziccolella
observes the doctrine that Community directives must be clear
and unconditional in order to have direct effect as law in the
Member States; and that in Marshall II the Court expanded this
doctrine by according uncommon elasticity to the words "clear
and unconditional." While noting that the Court's judgment
was "a surprisingly liberal" interpretation and an activist ruling,
Ms. Ziccolella nonetheless hails the decision as a welcome development because it firmly advances the effort of the Community
to eliminate gender discrimination. Thus, an example of the
eternal tension; the seduction of doing "what's right" for the
good of the Community at the expense of established doctrine
and Member State choice.
The treatment of state aids in this issue is unusually textured, with an Article by Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Director-General of Competition of the European Commission, juxtaposed
with an Article by Frederic Yves Jenny, Vice-Chairman of the
Conseil de la Concurrence in France - a country whose industrial policy tools generously include state aids. The combination
of the two pieces gives a unique perspective on the fit of industrial policy tools with a regime of free movement and undistorted competition and on both the promise and the problems
of a federal governmental system for administering a policy limiting state-granted subsidies.
The piece by Dr. Ehlermann provides historical background
on the state action aspects of competition policy - limits on
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public enterprise action as well as state aids. He shows the remarkable effort of the EC in breaking ground in this important
area of competition policy (which incidentally is overlooked in
most nations with respect to their own internal markets, and yet
is becoming an important agenda item in international trade
talks). He describes the progress of the EC in expanding to the
free trade area with the Eastern European countries its policy to
regulate state acts that harm trade and competition. The Jenny
paper digs deeply more than broadly. He points out the panoply
of often inconsistent objectives of nations in granting state aids
as well as of the Community in maintaining surveillance over
them (for example, the desire to help small and middle sized
firms, workers, and consumers). Jenny stresses the opaqueness
of Commission policy in the area, the inconsistency of its rulings,
and the lack of economic market analysis underlying them, and
in so doing he provides specific direction for policy reform.
A step away from government enterprise with power is the
private firm with power, whose acts are regulated by Article 86 of
the EC Treaty, as described by John Temple Lang, a Director in
the Directorate General for Competition. The lucid Article of
Mr. Temple Lang thoroughly analyzes the EC law on companies'
duties to supply competitors and to grant access to essential facilities. The seamless quality of EC law reappears. Just as governments may not discriminate against non-nationals in the internal
market, firms with control over essential facilities may not discriminate (against outsiders), without justification (e.g., no
spare capacity). Just as governments may not block access to
markets, dominant firms may not deny access. Just as governmental trade-restraining action, if allowed at all, must be proportional, dominant firm acts that block significant economic opportunities are forbidden if notjustified, and they cannot bejustified if they are not proportional to achieve proper objectives.
A critique may be made, and has been made, regarding substantive law under Article 86. EC law's deficit of economic analysis, and its overbreadth in finding dominance and in imposing
duties to deal have been noted.' The point I make here runs in
the other direction; the point is that the EC, uniquely, has seen
3. E.g., Eleanor M. Fox, Monopolization and Dominance in the United States and the
European Community: Efficiency, Opportunity, and Fairness, 61 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 981
(1986).
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and acted on the links between government and private traderestraining action, especially market-blocking action, even while
the trading nations of the world appear to have just discovered
the gap between trade law and competition law and are searching for ways to understand the commonalities and to bridge the
gap.
Fernando Pombo, a learned practitioner in Madrid, provides the exposition on EC telecommunications law. Telecommunications, which two decades ago was highly regulated by national and local authorities of nationalistic and often discriminatory bent, is now at center stage in the global economy.
Liberalization from intrusive regulation is occurring throughout
the world just as world competition is intensifying and telecommunications, linked with other media, is seen as the foundation
for fluid trans-world communications; a partner in the global information superhighway. The European Community has
worked hard and long on liberalizing telecommunications. EC
liberalization includes not only legislation - some standardization, mutual recognition and harmonization - but also competition law enforcement to assure that the firms with power do
not take the seductive opportunities to enhance their profits at
the expense of consumers and competitors. The telecommunications industry provides a window for observing the integrated
and linking economic policies of the Commission. Thus, in the
paper by Mr. Pombo we meet again the EC policies for access,
nondiscrimination (in procurement and access), and transparency. As well, we encounter the multitude of ways in which
potentially conflicting regulatory regimes of the Member States
may be brought closer and closer into harmony.
As we approach the end of the issue, we return to the overarching tension - centralism versus autonomy. Paul D. Marquardt has contributed the stimulating Article, Subsidiarity and
Sovereignty in the European Union. Mr. Marquardt explores the
roots and modern usage of the word and the doctrine "subsidiarity." He observes the incorporation of subsidiarity into the
Treaty on European Union; a concept heralded as the means
and method to save the autonomy of the member nations. In
the view of Mr. Marquardt (I believe), the rhetoric of subsidiarity
is a cynical ploy to keep the critics of the European Union at bay
while offering nothing to the concerned Europeans who wish to
preserve the souls of their nations. Indeed, he makes the argu-
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ment that subsidiarity, which dictates that power be preserved at
the lowest possible level for effective formation and implementation of policy, dictates that the most significant power will flow
up to the European institutions in the name of technological
efficiency, and that most other powers will devolve to a local
level, bypassing the nation state. Thus, a cruel hoax.
I am not persuaded of the emptiness and perversity of subsidiarity. To the contrary, I view the concept as one of conceptual beauty, providing a framework for addressing the challenge
of the twenty-first century.4 Particularly is this so for a community of nations whose future depends not only on national uniqueness and choice but also on common cause. Even for those
who, like me, are attracted to the seamless economic blueprint
for Europe, the observations of Mr. Marquardt are an important
call to action. Unless subsidiarity itself becomes a doctrine that
is transparent and meaningful in decreeing the devolution of
power, it will muddy rather than clarify the waters of Europe.
This instrumental role, I must add, is explicitly not a role that
Mr. Marquardt wishes to play, for he sees subsidiarity as a telling
by-product of a technocratic Europe, consolidating power and
efficiency at the expense of identity and trust.
CONCLUSION
This Ninth Annual Issue on European Community Law is a
volume on The Work of Europe.' In their explorations of the
problems confronted and the choices made in the European
Community, the Articles reveal the challenges confronting a
community coming together for the common good of its people.
I have suggested above that The Work of Europe is relevant
to The Work of the World, but with differences. The major difference is that the trading nations of the world have no need for
the depth of integration that galvanized Europe. Yet, like Europe, the world would, in my view, profit from greater openness
of markets, less parochialism, higher levels of transparency and
4. The challenge is to discover what linkages should be forged at higher than national level to avoid narrow nationalism and thereby to unleash opportunities for the
peoples of the world, and to determine how the linkages should be forged in view of
the objective to preserve maximum national and local autonomy consistent with the
linking regime.
5. See R REiCH, THE WORK OF NATIONS: PREPARING OURSELVES FOR 21sr CENTURY
CAPrriAUSM (1991).
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market access, and harmonization of regimes of regulation when
disparate systems are costly and harmony will facilitate freedoms
and opportunities and tend to improve standards of living without trampling upon important values.6 For its internal market,
Europe has grappled with the many facets of these problems, as
the Articles in this issue show. Many answers for the world trading system are bound to be different.' But Europe has posed
and is posing the right questions, and for this reason, the world
can learn from Europe.

6. For a study of why and when harmonization of law might be indicated and how
it might be achieved, see Committee on the United States in a Global Economy, Harmonizing
and Coordinatingthe Economic Law of Nations: A ComparativeStudy, 49 Ruc. Ass'N BAR Crry
N.Y. 800 (1994) (studying securities law, intellectual property law, environmental law,
and antitrust law).
7. For example, Europe needed a common competition policy to effectuate deep
market integration and to prevent a patchwork of disparate and warring national industrial policies from blocking its way. No similar need drives the trading nations of the
world and a much more minimal system of linking principles and national enforcement
is possible and I believe desirable. See Eleanor M. Fox, Competition Law and the Next
Agenda for the GATT/WTO: Forging the Links of Competition and Trade, 4 Pac. Rim L. &
Pol'yJ. - (forthcoming 1995).

